Ius Gentium

University of Baltimore School of Law's Center for International and Comparative Law Fellows discuss international and comparative legal issues

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The Climate Summit 2014 – The Best of Intentions, But Missed the Mark

Natalie Krajinovic

The Climate Summit 2014 was held on September 23, 2014 at the UN Headquarters in New York City.

The UN Climate Summit commenced last week in New York City, coinciding with Climate Week. The heightened attention brought to last week’s events echoes serious concerns involving the environment and international obligations. These events are indicative of the growing attention paid to states’ relationship with the environment, yet what is lacking from these events is substantive reform that will have a lasting, positive impact on the environment. 

There have been a large number of demonstrations and rallies prior to the UN Climate Summit, urging heads of states to take more stringent action to prevent climate change. The People’s Climate March “ . . . campaign[ed] for curbs on carbon emissions, ahead of the UN climate summit in New York . . . In Manhattan, organisers said some 310,000 people joined a march that was also attended by UN chief Ban Ki-moon. Earlier, huge demonstrations took place in Australia and Europe.”[1] These global demonstrations have involved more than 600,000 people, with the rallies in New York accounting for more than half of the global demonstrators.[2]


Despite the public outcry for environmental reform, critics of climate change conferences have urged for stronger action by states, instead of general good-faith obligations to manage climate change. “Underneath the overheated rhetoric [of the Summit] and the U.N. platitudes about acting together, the signs of failure are already apparent. The original intent of the summit was to put world leaders on the spot . . . Instead, the leaders that came were let off the hook . . . [as] they are only expected to submit their proposals by March next year” before the next summit in Paris.[3] Critics are ultimately demanding stronger state response to climate change, but have yet to see quantitative results.

International law, by nature, is often difficult to bridge with domestic law and environmental law, in particular, poses many enforcement challenges. For example, states are not necessarily required to enforce environmental protection law within their domestic jurisdiction unless they give credence to international environmental treaties. Furthermore, the limited use of judicial enforcement for international environmental law means that enforcement is problematic.[4] Ultimately, the faulty enforcement of international law allows for the inconsistent implementation of environmental law reform.

Alternative renewable energy sources should be promoted in any new environmental protection reform.

This particular UN Climate Change Summit initially appeared to have a different tone from climate change conferences in the past. Attending states have affirmatively acknowledged the rising emissions levels and other environmental deteriorations and have vocalized the need for more stringent reform. For example, China pledged for the first time to take strong action against climate change as result of its emissions levels (the world’s highest) peaking in the near future.[5] Yet, the recent crises of the rise of IS,[6] tensions between Ukraine and Russia,[7] and the West African Ebola epidemic have overshadowed the importance of environmental protections.

Despite the seriousness of these global events, the Summit was the largest meeting of world leaders on climate change.[8] The aim is now for global leaders to reconvene in Paris in 2015 to assemble an agreement specifically addressing environmental concerns.[9] Yet, when we look at the effectiveness of this year’s Summit, there is much to be desired in terms of a stringent framework specifically targeting environmental protection. Robert Orr, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning, stated that “[w]e now need a meaningful, universal climate agreement.”[10] Such a climate agreement is the missing tool needed to enforce consistent and qualitative environmental protection standards.


Part of the issue regarding the global acceptance of environmental protection agreement involves states’ priority of having such a treaty. Wealthy nations that are ranked “very high” according to the UN Human Development Index have ranked environmental protection as number nine out of sixteen in a list of societal measures.[11] Poorer nations ranked as “low” according to the UN Human Development Index have ranked environmental protection as last in a list of the same societal measures.[12] These two statistics bring up worrying implications. First, wealthy nations still ranked environmental protection relatively low, indicating their sluggish interest in environmental preservation. Second, poorer nations are simply unable to afford the costly and intensive measures needed to reduce emissions. Ultimately, the disparity in wealth indicates the wide-ranging difference in environmental protection interest – those who can financially do something about the problem have no interest in doing anything.

Arguably, the best outcome for this Summit would have resulted in a stringent frameworks for pollution and emissions regulation agreed to by all participants. International environmental law, like many areas of international law, relies heavily upon the use of international convention, treaties and customary norms as a method of governance.[13] This disconnect between priorities only further strengthens the argument that the global community as a whole must respond to climate change. Poorer nations simply cannot afford to alter their behavior to allow for environmental protections. Wealthy nations, however, have the capacity to not only develop their own environmental standards, but assist these developing nations in reforming their environmental policy. It is only through this wide-reaching commitment that environmental protection reform will occur.


Natalie Krajinovic is a University of Baltimore School of Law J.D. candidate (’15), with a concentration in Business Law. She holds an Honors Bachelor of Arts in English and East Asian Studies from the University of Toronto, St. George. Natalie has always had an interest in international law and policy. While studying at the University of Toronto, she was the Editor-in-Chief of the Toronto Globalist, an international relations magazine with chapters across the globe. She currently serves as the President of the International Law Society and as the Comments Editor for the Journal of International Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. Natalie is also a law clerk for John H. Denick & Associates, P.A., a business law firm in downtown Baltimore.

[1] Laura Westbrook, Climate change summit: Global rallies demand action, BBC News (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-29301969.

[2] Id.

[3] Rupert Darwall, The Air Comes Out of the Climate Change Talks, Real Clear Politics (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/09/24/the_air_comes_out_of_the_climate_change_talks_124087.html.

[4] Omar E. García-Bolívar, Lack of Judicial Independence and Its Impact on Transnational and International Litigation, 18 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 29, 32 (2012) (citing John S. Baker Jr. & Agustín Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation Between U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1, 24 (2010) (“Countries are not compelled to enforce foreign judgments but do so as a matter of comity, which “[r]ests on the principle of reciprocity which is generally the basis for relations among sovereign nations.”).

[5] UN climate summit: China pledges emissions action, BBC News (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-29334807.

[6] Ryan Crocker, Airstrikes on ISIS Should Expand to Syria, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/22/should-the-us-work-with-assad-to-fight-isis/airstrikes-on-isis-should-expand-to-syria.

[7] David M. Herszenhorn, Ukrainian President Sets Sights on Closer E.U. Ties, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/europe/petro-poroshenko-ukraine-eu.html?ref=world.

[8] After the Summit, planners look toward Lima, then Paris, Climate Summit 2014 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/summit-planners-look-toward-lima-paris/.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Brad Plumer, Why rich countries worry more about global warming than poor ones, Vox (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/23/6835285/why-rich-countries-worry-more-about-climate-change-than-poor-ones.

[12] Id.

[13] International Law: Cases and Materials 1486 (Lori F. Damrosch, et al. eds.) (5th ed. 2009).

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Justification for Attacking IS – Is it Legal?

Clark Smith

In the wake of the President’s address to the nation on forthcoming US-led action against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, foreign officials abroad and legal scholars at home are lambasting the President for his presumed lack of legal justification.  In a primetime speech on September 10, the President laid out his strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS.  In short, his four-part strategy includes: continued air strikes against IS targets, though now expanding to Syria; increased support to forces fighting IS, in the form of additional US uniformed trainers and advisors in Iraq and providing of arms, equipment, and coordination for training to forces inside Syria; continued counterterrorism efforts aimed at denying IS necessary logistics and support by working with international partners to cut off funding, stem the inflow of foreign fighters, and countering IS propaganda; and further humanitarian assistance to those displaced by IS.  Although the President claims bipartisan support, he also claims “the authority to address the threat from ISIL.”  It is the airstrikes planned for Syria-based IS targets and the President’s presumed basis for authority to attack IS more broadly that concerns legal experts.

Iraq map locator

Both Syria and its ally Russia assert that any US airstrikes against targets in Syria would be in violation of international law.  A Syrian government spokesman warned that “any action [against IS] without the consent of the Syrian government would be an attack on Syria.”  And despite ongoing Russian involvement in the Ukraine, a Russian spokesman warned that any US action in Syria absent “an appropriate decision of the UN Security Council, [] would become an act of aggression, a crude violation of the norms of international law.”  Article 2(4) of the UN Charter would certainly seem to support Russia’s assertion of the Syrian position.  And with Russia’s position on the Security Council, a Security Council decision supporting the US strategy is all but impossible.  But, a Security Council decision condemning, or even prohibiting, the forthcoming US action in Syria is equally impossible.  Just as international law has been ineffective in curbing Russian aggression in the Ukraine, so too will it be ineffective in facilitating the efforts of any of the US’s detractors in dismantling IS.  Even if legitimate international law concerns did exist regarding the US strategy for addressing the IS threat, the US interests do, and should, outweigh those concerns (I make this argument here in my law article, on page 192).

Mapping the Syrian Conflict

More concerning to legal scholars, at least from a domestic perspective, is the President’s claim that he already has “the authority to address the threat from ISIL.”  Presumably, the President is referring to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks.  The key language of that AUMF indicates…

“…the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

Since being passed for combat operations in Afghanistan, the AUMF has also provided the legal basis for attacks against al Qaeda, and affiliates, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.  Just last year Pentagon legal experts defended broad authority under the AUMF when testifying at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.  According to the Pentagon legal experts, “the broad interpretation of the AUMF [] gives them the flexibility to deal with the changing threat in a lawful, effective manner.”  Members of the Committee disagreed with the broad authorization assessment, yet no specific solutions were suggested.  Just weeks after that Senate Committee hearing, the President called for a repeal of the AUMF referring to it as the “perpetual war” law.  What he did not call for, however, was a deadline by which to repeal it.  Probably not a calculated risk, but not addressing the “perpetual war” law was a good move in hind-sight.

Obama IS Announcement

In recent months, the Commander in Chief appeared to be relying on his Article II powers to prosecute the limited campaign against IS targets in Northern Iraq.  This was evidenced by the multiple War Powers Resolution letters sent to Congress keeping them informed.  Relying on this authority for the limited strikes and in light of several AUMFs being considered, if not avoided, in Congress in the run up to the President’s speech, it was no doubt quite a surprise when the President claimed he already had the necessary authority to prosecute a sustained campaign against IS.  Experts question why the President did not insist first on Congressional support, but the President has been down that road only a year earlier when Congressional support for action against Assad’s Syrian regime for their use of chemical weapons on their own citizens was clearly, and embarrassingly, unobtainable.

The President’s justification for waging sustained conflict against IS, reliance on the 2001 AUMF, is a stretch indeed.  But it is plausible.  According to the language of the AUMF, the President determines those persons or organizations that participated in the 9/11 attacks.  That was clearly al Qaeda.  Since that time, the President has retained authority to use that AUMF to attack al Qaeda affiliates in South Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa.  The stretch, albeit a plausible one, is identifying IS as an al Qaeda affiliate or at least something that was at one time an affiliate of al Qaeda.  IS was born of al Qaeda in Iraq and only recently did Ayman Zawahiri disavow IS.  This same organization, regardless of name, attacked US forces in Iraq during the Iraqi war and continues to carry on the legacy of the former al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden.

In the end, the point may be moot if the President can get the Congressional authorization he very much wants, but is very reluctant to ask for.

Clark Smith is a third-year law student pursuing a concentration in International Law. He has undergraduate and graduate degrees in Political Science and International Relations. In addition to being a Student Fellow, he is the Submissions Editor for the Journal of International Law. His previous experience includes work in both security and policy and his previous overseas postings include Western Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and South Asia. His professional interests include international development.

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A Twisted Tale of Legitimacy – The ICJ’s Decisions in Latin America

Maya Zegarra

By agreeing to become member states of the United Nations (UN), states have accepted the legitimacy and authority of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Chapter XIV of the UN Charter establishes the ICJ, as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”[1]. In fact, article 92 requires all members of the UN to comply with the decisions of any case to which they are a party.[2] Also, article 36 of the ICJ Statute states that the court has jurisdiction by special agreement or when member states agree to it. Additionally, article 2(3) of the UN Charter, requires all members to settle international disputes by peaceful means. In Latin America, most states have even gone a step further and have agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICJ via the Pact of Bogotá (April 30, 1948), agreeing that Latin American states should settle any disputes peacefully through the ICJ.


In theory, this seems to be a fair structure: a State agrees to be part of the UN, and therefore agrees to adhere to its Charter, which recognizes the ICJ as its highest judicial order. However, in practice, some states who were either unsuccessful or in disagreement with the ICJ’s decision in their case have rejected the ICJ’s ruling, questioned its legitimacy, or have gone as far as withdrawn from the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

On January 18, 1985, the U.S. informed the ICJ that it had withdrawn from the proceedings of Nicaragua v US,[3] arguing that the “the Court lack[ed] jurisdiction and competence.”  In 1986, the ICJ entered its decision on this case and found the U.S. in violation of international law, stating that the U.S. was “in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State.”[4] The U.S. contested ICJ jurisdiction, claiming that the ICJ could not hear cases arising under multi-lateral treaties, and finally U.S. withdrew its consent to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.

On December 6, 2001, Nicaragua filed an application to introduce proceedings before the ICJ in order to determine whether Nicaragua or Colombia had sovereignty over a number of islands in the San Andrés Archipelago (Western Caribbean) and to determine the maritime boundaries between Colombia’s and Nicaragua’s continental shelf. This dispute goes back to the early 19th century, when Latin American states were fighting for their independence from Spain. On December 13, 2007, the ICJ delivered its opinion and concluded that the court had jurisdiction, under article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá[5], and ruled that a group of the disputed islands belonged to Colombia, but extended Nicaragua’s maritime limits.


Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, gratefully stated, “The court has given to Nicaragua what belonged to us: thousands of kilometers of natural resources”. Meanwhile Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos openly rejected the ICJ’s judgment and stated that the ruling “cannot be implemented” claiming that new international borders can only be established by bilateral agreements.[6] Finally, President Santos decided to take extreme measures and announced that he was pulling Colombia out of the Pact of Bogotá, renouncing its membership on November 27, 2012.

On January, 27, 2014, the ICJ issued its judgment regarding the maritime dispute between Peru and Chile, which dates back from the Pacific War of (1879-1883). The ICJ decided that a maritime boundary already existed between Peru and Chile, and created a new method not offered by either party to create the demarcation.[7] The ICJ created a starting point (Marker 1) and a parallel maritime boundary line that extended 80 nautical miles (Point A), and then extended the boundary to 200 nautical miles (Point B), then dropped down the border at a Point C, where the maritime boundary would end for both states.


Because the ICJ did not use the solutions proposed by either Peru or Chile, the judgment was received with nationalist reactions by both states. Former Chilean President, Sebastián Piñera said he “profoundly disagree[d] with the decision…and the economic loss of an area of between 20,000 and 22,000 km2 in favor of Peru.”, while the current President, Michelle Bachelet, stated this was a “grievous loss.” Peruvian President Ollanta Humala stated “the country will benefit from the exploitation of one of the richest marine areas in the world”. However, unlike in the Nicaragua-Colombia conflict, both states have agreed to implement the ICJ’s ruling gradually.

A more controversial case is Bolivia v. Chile, which is currently pending before the ICJ. Bolivia hopes to reclaim coastal access to the Pacific Ocean that it had lost after the Pacific War. Bolivia is requesting the ICJ to compel Chile to negotiate, in good faith, an agreement that would grant Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean.

Bolivian President Evo Morales Ayma speech delivered on March 23, 2013 stated: “The sea we are claiming as a matter of justice is a sea for the people […] a sea for the Great Fatherland; the Bolivian people shall never renounce the sea, Bolivia shall never be at peace so long as the maritime issue remains unresolved, because giving a solution to this kind of issues is a part of integration”.[8] In fact, Chilean President Bachelet stated on national television that Chile will contest the ICJ jurisdiction in this case.[9] This is despite the fact that Chile had already accepted the ICJ’s judgment in the Peru v. Chile case.


It is reasonable and understandable for a State to defend its sovereignty; this is in fact a well-known principle of international law, which supports the idea that a State has the ability to exercise control over its land and people. However, it is important to remember that International Law is based on consent and, importantly, good faith (pacta sunt servanda). If States agree to be bound by an agreement or treaty, it is central that they actually follow through and act according to what they have already agreed. The UN Charter and the Pact of Bogotá have acquired legitimacy because parties have voluntarily accepted them and agreed to act based on them.

The ICJ was created to help states peacefully resolve their conflicts and states agreed to be bound by the ICJ’s decisions. So, it is vital that countries who agreed to be bound by an agreement or treaty, act according to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”). After all, international law has been created from the free will of states as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as laws (i.e. customary international law). Withdrawing participation from the ICJ in these types of situations gives the impression of adopting a sore-loser attitude – if a country cannot win before the ICJ, then they will stop participating. When this happens, it chips away at the legitimacy of the ICJ and stops international law from advancing.


Maya Zegarra is a third-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, planning to graduate in May 2015 with a concentration in International Law. She has a Sociology degree, and is fluent in Spanish, German, English and French. Maya grew up in Peru and attended a German high school, where she participated in a student exchanged program and lived in the Baden-Württemberg area in Germany for four months.

During the summer after her first year of law school, Maya studied abroad in France, where she focused on French Law, European Union Law, and Comparative Fundamental Rights. While in France, she interned with an international and criminal defense attorney. Most recently, she participated in the Annual International Humanitarian Law Seminar, hosted by University of Virginia Law, in March 2014. Her primary interests are international law and international humanitarian law. Through her internships Maya has worked on cases related to asylum, refugee, and immigration law.

In addition to being a Fellow at the Center for International and Comparative Law, Maya currently serves as the Publications Editor for the Journal of International Law, President of the Latin American Law Student Association, Vice-President of International Law Society, Treasurer of the Immigration Law Association, and 3L Representative of the University of Baltimore Students for the Public Interest. Maya is also a Maryland Rule 16 Student Attorney at the Immigrant Rights Clinic.


[1] U.N. Charter art 92.

[2] U.N. Charter art 94.

[3] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).

[4] Id.

[5] American Treaty on Pacific Settle “Pact of Bogotá”, Apr. 30, 1948, 449 U.N.T.S. 30.

[6]  UN ruling gives Colombia isles but Nicaragua more sea, BBC (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20391180.


[7] Peru v. Chile, 2014 I.C.J. 137 (Jan. 27).

[8] Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, The book of the Sea 6 (Strategic Management For Maritime Vindication Edition, 2nd rev. ed. 2014).

[9] Bachelet: Chile will challenge ICJ jurisdiction in Bolivia case, The Santiago Times (Jul. 8, 2014), http://santiagotimes.cl/bachelet-chile-will-challenge-icj-jurisdiction-bolivia-case/.



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National Security Outweighs Travel Rights: The Confiscation of Passports as a Necessary Response to Increased Terrorist Threats in the U.K.

Natalie Krajinovic

The recent conflicts in Syria and Iraq have had a substantial impact on the domestic policy of foreign nations. It was recently announced that the U.K. has raised its terror level threat to “substantial” following these conflicts.[1]  Specifically, British Prime Minister David Cameron has voiced his intent to enforce new legislation that would make it easier for U.K. authorities to confiscate passports from individuals who are travelling abroad to fight in the conflicts.[2] These temporary powers granted to officials would involve powers to seize the passports of British nationals fighting in the Middle East who are attempting to return to the U.K. to conduct terrorist operations.[3]

Under the Royal Prerogative, U.K. authorities already have the power to confiscate an individual’s passport if it is in the public interest to stop that individual from travelling.[4] Passport confiscations have occurred twenty three (23) times since April 2013 in order to prevent individuals from travelling abroad for alleged terrorist-related or criminal activity.[5] These new measures, however, are aimed specifically at eliminating terrorist threats stemming from extremist groups, such as ISIS. In particular, news of the British national, who is suspected as the member of ISIS responsible for the brutal killings of American journalists, has undoubtedly raised concerns for the U.K. in heightening security standards.[6]

The confiscation of passports, whether indefinite or temporary, has serious implications not only for the individual from whom the passport is confiscated, but also for the global community as a whole. By allowing officials to confiscate passports from individuals suspected of terrorist acts, the U.K. government is sending a clear message that public security outweighs the free movement of individuals. An individual’s ability to exit and re-enter a given country is a deeply respected aspect of belonging to a nationality. To overly control an individual’s ability to travel to foreign nations encroaches upon jurisdictional concerns, particularly when an individual holds dual citizenship.

POLITICS Passport 1


It is imperative that the screening process to determine whether an individual has substantial links to an extremist group and poses a terrorist threat be well-developed. There exists the risk that passports may be confiscated without properly substantiating the individual’s terrorist threat. There must be a line drawn between substantiated confiscations for public protection and premature preventative confiscations based on unfounded predictions. Prime Minister Cameron has stated that confiscating passports of suspected terrorists would not apply to British nationals who hold one passport since the confiscation of their passport would render the individual stateless.[7] Therefore this initiative would only apply to British nationals who hold two passports.[8] By limiting passport confiscation to individuals with dual nationality, it appears as though the U.K. government is targeting individuals with close, direct ties to areas suspected of terrorist activity.

These recent developments ultimately demonstrate that possessing a passport requires that individuals respect the value and implications of national citizenship. As a member of the European Union, the U.K. has a distinct awareness of foreign regulation for the prevention of terrorist activity. For example, the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy specifically aims to “pursue and investigate terrorists, impede planning, travel and communications, [and] cut off access to funding and materials and bring terrorists to justice.”[9] The curtailing of terrorist and criminal acts are extremely valid reasons for the confiscation of passports by U.K. authorities. Such measures are imperative for the control of domestic terrorist acts and for the prevention of the movement of individuals to foreign states for the purpose of terrorist and illegal activity on a global level.

The current crises in Syria and Iraq, and increased threat of terrorist activity resulting from these conflicts, also have serious implications for the United States. While the U.S. has not increased their threat level, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest has recently stated that American and British officials have been in contact in order to evaluate terrorist threats posed by Western-born foreign fighters in Syria returning home.[10]


The close monitoring of these threats and any increase in danger will likely result in the U.S. making comparable policy and legal determinations as the U.K. The crux of the current U.K. legislation is aimed at U.K passport confiscation based upon preventing individuals who are attempting to return to the U.K. after having traveled from engaging in terrorist regimes. Under current U.S. law, “a person’s naturalization can be revoked either by civil proceeding or pursuant to a criminal conviction,” and cases typically involve the individual falsifying information to fraudulently procure U.S. citizenship.[11]  It would be reasonable for the U.S. government to strengthen their passport confiscation scheme for the purpose of limiting terrorist activity in the U.S. Public safety certainly trumps a suspected terrorist’s ability to enter the country using a valid passport. The U.S.’ reliance upon passport confiscation should seek to curb potential terrorist threats both domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, the need to preserve public safety outweighs an individual’s capacity to possess a passport. The protectionary measures taken by U.K. authorities are a reasonable and necessary response to terrorist activity. As tensions rise with extremist groups in Islamic regions, it is likely that more nations will rely upon stricter policies that forbid certain individuals connected to extremist groups from entering their borders.


Natalie Krajinovic is a University of Baltimore School of Law J.D. candidate (’15), with a concentration in Business Law. She holds an Honors Bachelor of Arts in English and East Asian Studies from the University of Toronto, St. George. Natalie has always had an interest in international law and policy. While studying at the University of Toronto, she was the Editor-in-Chief of the Toronto Globalist, an international relations magazine with chapters across the globe. She currently serves as the President of the International Law Society and as the Comments Editor for the Journal of International Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. Natalie is also a law clerk for John H. Denick & Associates, P.A., a business law firm in downtown Baltimore.


[1] UK terror threat level raised to ‘severe’, BBC (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28986271.

[2] Id.

[3] Kim Hjelmgaard, British terror suspects may be stripped of passports, USA Today (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/09/01/uk-anti-terror-powers-cameron/14921581/.

[4] UK terror threat level raised to ‘severe’, BBC (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28986271.

[5] Id.

[6] Jessica Elgot, Who Is The Hip Hop Jihadi Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary, Linked With James Foley’s Murder? Here’s 9 Things We Know, The Huffington Post UK (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/24/abdel-majed-abdel-bary-hip-hop-jihadi-is-james-foley_n_5705043.html.

[7] Kim Hjelmgaard, British terror suspects may be stripped of passports, USA Today (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/09/01/uk-anti-terror-powers-cameron/14921581/.

[8] Id.

[9] Crisis & Terrorism, European Commission Home Affairs (May 28, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/index_en.htm.

[10] Michael Walsh and Rich Shapiro, UK raises threat level to severe, PM blames ‘poisonous ideology of Islamic extremism’ — U.S. level stays same, New York Daily News (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/britain-raises-threat-level-severe-terrorist-attack-highly-article-1.1921283.

[11] USCIS Policy Manual, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartL-Chapter1.html#text:note-ID0EMP2Q.